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The référé législatif
and the cahiers de doléances of 1789
di Paolo Alvazzi del Frate
In this presentation I would like to trace the origins of the so-called référé
législatif in the texts of the French Cahiers de doléances, presented to the
Estates-General of 1789. In the first part, I will describe the référé législatif sys-
tem, its historical sources and its links to the juridical doctrine of the 18th cen-
tury. In the second part, I will stress the contribution of the cahiers de
doléances of 1789 to the creation of the so-called référé législatif process by the
National Assembly in 1790. Inmy conclusion, I will try to demonstrate that this
process derives both from Enlightenment Thought and the Old Regime legal
tradition. For this reason the référé législatif received widespread approval in
the revolutionary National Assembly.
1. The référé législatif was created by the National Assembly with the
statutes of August 16, 1790 (art. 12, tit. II) and of November 27, 1790 (art. 21).
It was based on two different legal concepts: the “facultative” and the “compul-
sory” référé: 1) the facultative concept was claimed by a judge for a doubt in
interpretation or for a legislative hole encountered during a trial; 2) the com-
pulsory concept was provoked by a conflict in interpretation between the
French Supreme Court – the Tribunal de Cassation – and a Court to which an
annulled case was assigned. The two référés were different, but they derived
from the same principles. So it is possible to describe their common origins.
The référé législatifwas composed of two aspects: 1) the prohibition for the
judge to interpret the laws when making a ruling (we can define this as prohi-
bition of interpretation); 2) the obligation for him to refer to the legislator
whenever he considers it necessary to interpret a law or to enact a new one. In
the first case, the judge identifies an interpretative doubt, and in the second, a
legislative hole.
It is necessary to clarify that in the Old Regime the French juridical doctrine
used to consider the “interpretation of statutes” as a broad judicial function. It
was the so called in latin interpretatio in the Jus commune system that was not
only a judicial function, but also a legislative function. The judge had the power
to solve doubts by interpretation, to fill a legislative hole, and to extend or
reduce the range of the application of statutes. So, the application was distin-
guished from the interpretation. For example, the French jurist Rodier wrote
in the 17th century that «the Judge must apply the statutes to the facts of the
case, but only the Legislator – namely the King – can interpret them»1.
Today the doctrine considers the term interpretation to define only the
process in which we can give statutes a meaning. Therefore, it is impossible to
distinguish clear from obscure legal texts because all statutes – even the sim-
plest – need and have multiple interpretations. There is no applicationwithout
an interpretation.
The theoretical structure of référé législatif is derived from the rigid con-
ception of separation of powers. Particularly it stresses the separation between:
1) the phase inwhich the legal rule is created (legislation); 2) the phase inwhich
it is applied (jurisdiction).
From this point of view the interpretation was considered an activity of
creating the law, so a normative activity. If interpretation is a form of creat-
ing rules, it therefore must be denied to the Courts and assigned exclusively
to the legislators. Only the legislators have the power to interpret the law, as
written in the famous maxim of Roman law Ejus est interpretari, cuius est
condere leges. The only form of interpretation permitted is the authentic
interpretation because it is enacted by the legislator with an interpretative
law that has general effects.
After any doubt in interpretation is resolved by the legislator’s intervention,
the judge can decide the controversy applying the interpretative law. The
process was simple and coherent. Its main purpose was to guarantee the “puri-
ty” of the statute law and avoid the risk of misunderstanding the real meaning
of the statutes provoked by the decisions of the Courts. This was a strong instru-
ment for preventing the success of a legal system of judicial precedents.
The référé législatif was not a totally new creation of the French
Revolution. Its sources are ancient and can be found in Justinian law, Canon
law, and French law: a) in Justinian Law the concepts of “ban of Interpretatio”
and the process of relatio ad Principem, that is the obligation to refer to the
Emperor in case of doubt of interpretation already existed. This obligation was
based on several roman statutes. For example, in the constitution of 539 a.d.De
legibus et constitutionibus principum et edictis («tam conditor quam interpres
legum solus imperator iuste existimabitur2») and in the Tanta constitution
(Digestum)3, «[Imperatori] soli concessum est leges et condere, et interpre-
tari»; b) in Canon Law the authentic interpretation, after the Council of Trent,
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1 M.-A. Rodier, Questions sur l’Ordonnance de Louis XIV, du mois d’avril 1667, relatives aux
usages des Cours de Parlement, et principalement de celui de Toulouse, new edition, Toulouse,
Dupleix, 1679, p. 11.
2 C. 1.14.12: «leges condere soli imperatori concessum est, et leges interpretari solum dignum
imperio esse oportet (...) tam conditor quam interpres legum solus imperator iuste exis-
timabitur».
3 «Si (...) ambiguum fuerit visum, hoc ad imperiale culmen per iudices referatur, et ex auctori-
tate Augusta manifestetur, cui soli concessum est leges et condere, et interpretari».
became very important. The Bull Benedictus Deus enacted by Pius IV in 1563,
established the obligation to refer to the Pope (who was the legislator) when
there was a doubt of interpretation. In 1564 a Congregation for the execution
and interpretation of the Council of Trent was created by Pius V with the Bull
Alias nonnullas4; c) in French Law we can point out the Ordonnance civile of
Louis XIV of 1667. Its art. 7 of Title I, established that: «If during a trial (…) a
doubt or a problem emerges in the application of our statutes [the so called in
French ordonnances, édits, déclarations and lettres-patentes] we forbid the
judges to interpret them, instead we want them to stop the trials and wait to
hear our will». That was – once more – the prohibition of interpretation and
the obligation to refer to the legislator.
The members of the Constituent Assembly recognized that the origins of
the référé législatif could be found in Roman law. Robespierre even proposed
in 1790 to assume «themaxim, that was known in public Roman law and in our
traditional monarchist government: the Roman law established that interpre-
tation of the statutes belong to whom enacted the statutes: eius est interpretari
legem, qui condidit legem. If a different authority than the legislator were able
to interpret the statutes, that authority could modify them and heighten its will
above the legislator5».
Following the model of the Ordonnance civile, several reforms in Europe
established the prohibition of interpretation and the obligation to refer to the
legislator. We can mention, among others, the King Frederick II’s Prussian
project of civil code of 17496; the Leggi e Costituzioni of Charles Emmanuel III,
King of Sardinia in 1770; and also the Dispaccio reale of Ferdinand IV, King of
Naples, in 1774.
The goal of these reforms was to deny the Courts decisions from taking a
legislative role and assign the interpretation exclusively to the legislator. From
their point of view, the legislators were trying to stop the “usurpation” of the
legislation committed by the Courts.
To conclude this first part of my presentation about the Old Regime, I
would like to quote the definition of référé législatif written by Philippe-
Antoine Merlin in his Répertoire universel de jurisprudence:
[the référé législatif is] the process by which the judges, before deciding on an issue
that they considered impossible to solve, due to the ambiguity of the law or to a leg-
islative hole, referred to the authority holding the legislative power for the interpre-
tation7.
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4 Later with the Bull Immensa aeterni Dei enacted by Sixtus V in 1587, the Congregation became
the Congregatio pro executione et interpretatione Concilii Tridentini, to which «[si] dubietas
aut difficultas emerserint, interpretandi facultatem, nobis tamen consultis, impartimur».
5 25 mai 1790, in Archives parlementaires, I série, XV, p. 670.
6 Art. 7 and 8, Part. I, Book I.
7 Ph.-A. Merlin, Référé au législateur, in Répertoire, 5th ed., Paris 1827, XIV, p. 368.
8 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book 11, Ch. 6.
9 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des Lois, Liv. VI, ch. III. Book 6, Ch. 3.
10 Voltaire, Civil Laws, in Philosophical Dictionary.
11 P. Verri, Sulla interpretazione delle leggi, in «Il Caffè», 2 (1766), n. XXVIII.
12 C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene. Particularly in chap. 4, entitled Of the Interpretation of
Laws.
The contribution of the juridical doctrine of the Enlightenment to the cre-
ation of the référé législatif is so evident that we do not have to take time going
into delay on this point. We will just point out the diffusion of the following
two concepts in the 18th Century: 1) the judicial function as a syllogism, 2) the
negative connotation of the term interpretation of law as corruption of law.
That was the case of Montesquieu who considered the judicial function «in
some ways, null and void», because the judge does not have the right to inter-
pret the law, but only to apply it literally. The judges «are no more than the
mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of
moderating either its force or rigor8». The judges – according to Montesquieu
– must follow the law to the letter, «otherwise the law might be interpreted to
the prejudice of every citizen, in cases where their honour, property, or life are
concerned9».
Also very important was Voltaire’s doctrine. Take, for example, his affirma-
tion in his Philosophical dictionary: «let all laws be clear, uniform and precise:
to interpret laws is almost always to corrupt them10».
The Italian jurists of the Enlightenment in particular led a radical campaign
against the interpretation of laws. The most explicit essay was the article On
interpretation of laws published in 1766 in the periodical Il Caffé by Pietro
Verri. It is a very interesting text that can be considered as a “manifesto” of the
theory of legal interpretation of the Enlightenment11. Verri affirmed that «the
judge becomes the legislator if he is allowed to interpret the laws».
The same theories are presented by Cesare Beccaria in his Of Crimes and
Punishments12 in 1764 and by Gaetano Filangieri, Neapolitan jurist and
philosopher, in his Riflessioni politiche of 1774.
To summarize: the juridical thought of the Enlightenment was character-
ized by a campaign to demonstrate the negativity of the exaggerated legislative
role of the Courts with the goal of reserving all the legislative power for the leg-
islator. In the name of separation of powers, the jurists considered statute law,
the only source of law, in an almost holy light. Consequently, they had absolute
confidence in the legislator and a deep mistrust for judges. The judicial inter-
pretation was criticized by the Enlightenment doctrine because of the lack of
legal certainty. Their proposed solution was to enforce the judges to limit their
functions to a syllogistic application of the law. In this way only the authentic
interpretation – i.e. the interpretation of the legislator – was considered
admissible.
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2. In their juridical arguments, the cahiers de doléances, presented to the
Estates-General of 1789,mixed the traditional culture of theOldRegimewith cer-
tain requests of the Enlightenment doctrine13. The most influenced by the
Enlightenment culture were the cahiers of the Third Estate. Themajority of these
texts presented the petition of: 1) abolition of privileges, 2) constitutionalism, 3)
separation of powers, 4) codification of law, 5) unity of jurisdiction.
The Summary of the cahiers on judicial reformation established by the
counsellor14, an official document of 1789, gives a general view about the peti-
tions of these texts. We find the requests for: 1) unifying the Kingdom’s leg-
islation: «Art. 15. Let the civil and criminal codes be reformed, simplified,
and intelligible to everybody (…) to be applied uniformly in all the Kingdom»;
2) uniformity of the jurisprudence of the Courts: «Art. 19. Let the jurispru-
dence be uniforme for all Courts and deny them from enacting decisions
against the laws»; 3) banning judicial interpretation in order to avoid any
normative activity put into practice by the judges: «Art. 18. [It is forbidden
for judges] to repeal in part or interpret the laws»; 4) obliging Courts to
explain the motives for their rulings, in order to control and verify judicial
activity: «Art. 79 bis. Let all enacted judgements, civil or criminal, explain the
motivations for the decision».
Regarding the relations between legislation and jurisdiction, the cahiers
were substantially in agreement for claiming the separation of legislative
power from the judicial power. For that reason they requested a legislative
monopoly for the legislator, the abolition of the Arrêts de règlement and the
prohibition of interpretation. The general goal of the Third Estate was to con-
tain the political role of the Courts. So the limitation of judges’ functions was
considered an instrument to achieve this goal. The cahiers certainly aimed to
guarantee the independence of the judicial power, but they mainly tried to
protect the legislative power from the Courts interference. This attitude pre-
vailed in the Third Estate, whereas the cahiers of the of Aristocracy and Clergy
were more traditional and yet covered of a wide range of opinions. That can be
explained by considering the political role of privileged Estates (the 1st and
2nd) in the judicial system of the Old Regime.
To conclude, the most frequent judiciary claims in the cahiers de doléances
of 1789 were: 1) legislative unification, 2) prohibition of judicial interpretation,
3) obligation to explain the motives for all judgements.
The quotations in these texts are innumerable so the following quotations
must be considered only as samples.
It is necessary to clarify that the meaning of the terms code and codifica-
tion, employed in the these texts, does not correspond to the present meaning.
The authors of the cahiers intended to refer to the enactment of a code of civil
13 See Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, par J. Mavidal et E. Laurent, Ie série, volumes I-VI.
14 Published in E. Seligman, La justice en France pendant la Révolution, I, pp. 489-505.
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or criminal procedure – like the Codes of 1667 and 1670, the Ordonannces of
Louis XIV – and not to a code of substantial law. So, until the Revolution, the
term code was synonymous with code of procedure.
We will limit ourselves to quoting some of the most significant texts:
the interpretation of law shall be reserved for the legislator, the motives for each ruling
shall be explained in the judgements (tiers-état de Bailleul, Flandre maritime)15.
the judges shall be obliged to explain the motives of their ruling (...) the letter of the law
shall always be followed, without allowing the judges the right of interpretation (cahier de
la ville de Bergues-Saint-Winoc)16;
do not permit the Courts and judges to be able to depart from the text of the laws to allow
the creation of new ones under the pretext of interpreting them (clergé de Beauvais)17;
[today] all powers are confused in the judicial power... under the pretext of the Arrêts de
règlement, the Supreme Courts assigned themselves a portion of the legislative power
(noblesse de Blois)18;
The judges shall be obliged to follow the letter of the law, with no pretext to move away
from it (cahier général du Tiers de la sénéchaussée de Guyenne)19;
do not allow any Court or jurisdiction to extend or modify the laws (Tiers de la ville de
Brest)20;
[the judges] shall be limited through precise laws and shall only be witnesses of the laws,
apply the laws and not interpret them (noblesse de Bugey)21;
France needs to have a clear legal code, simple, and easy to apply ... in order to limit the
judge in his only function, i.e. to apply the laws and not to interpret them (cahier de la
paroisse de Clemart-sous-Meudon, Paris hors les murs)22;
the law cannot bemodified or interpreted but by another authentic law (cahier de la com-
munauté de la Ciotat)23.
The cahier of the community ofMirabeau is particularly significant because
it includes not only the ban of interpretation, but also the obligation to refer to
the legislator:
nothing shall be left to the judges’ free will; they must explain the motives of their judge-
ments and be accountable to them; it shall be forbidden to annotate the law, or to inter-
pret the laws in relation with the old ones, but in unprecedented cases, the judges must
stop the trial and refer to the King and to General Estates in order to enact a new addi-
tional law24.
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15 Cahier du Tiers-état de la Flandre maritime, Bailleul, art. 6, 7, Législation, in Arch. parl., I s.,
II vol., p. 177.
16 Cahier de la ville de Bergues-Saint-Winoc, Art. 7, 11, in Arch. parl., I s., II vol., p. 180.
17 Cahier du clergé de Beauvais, ibid. II, p. 291.
18 Cahier de la noblesse de Blois, ibid. p. 381.
19 Cahier général du Tiers de la sénéchaussée de Guyenne, ibid., p. 399.
20 Cahier du Tiers de la ville de Brest, ibid., p. 470.
21 Cahier de la noblesse de Bugey, ibid., II vol., p. 481.
22 Cahier de la paroisse de Clemart-sous-Meudon, Paris hors les murs, in Arch. parl., I s., IV vol.,
p. 442.
23 Cahier de la communauté de la Ciotat, art. 45, ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 532.
It is also the case of the Nobility’s cahier of the balliage of Evreux:
no Courts shall be able to modify, interpret or change the law (...) in any context. All the
interpretations, changes or regulations must be formally enacted by the legislator25.
3. Conclusions
Even if the cahiers de doléances of 1789 were not accurate from the legal
and systematic point of view, most of them clearly adhered to a system based
on a rigid separation of legislative powers from judicial powers. The interpreta-
tion of statute law was considered as a phase of the creation of legal rules so it
was denied to the judge and assigned exclusively to the legislator.
The référé législatif was not explicitly foreseen in the cahiers de doléances
but it was the logical consequence of the French legal doctrines of 18th Century.
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